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In the last issue of TIP, I suggested that the controversy over affirmative action would likely continue to heat up. That prediction has proven to be something of an understatement. In a ruling that will probably· force the Supreme Court to reconsider the affinnative action issue dUring its next session, a federal appellate court recently struck down on equal protection grounds an admissions policy at the University of Texas law school which gave preference to black and Hispanic applicants (Hopwood v. State of Texas, U.S. App. LEXIS 4719, 5th Cir., March 1996) . Although the appellate court's order to eliminate affirmative action-based admissions in Texas has been stayed pending further appeal, various proposals to end affirmative action are getting serious attention in state legislatures, public university governing boards, and grass-roots initiatives in Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Washington, respectively. Meanwhile, California has continued to serve as a lightning rod for affirmative action issues: the California Civil Rights Initiative (which would ban preferential treatment based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin) made it onto the fall ballot in March, a bill passed the Judiciary Committee of the state assembly in April which would impose criminal liability on any college or government official granting a racial or gender preference, the Clinton administration came under fire for awarding a $3.2 million contract through the Commerce Department's Minority Business Development Agency to a Los Angeles firm known to be running a huge operating deficit and carrying nearly $1 million in unpaid tax liens, and a San Francisco Bay Area county government stunned local affirmative action specialists and EEOC officials by disclosing the existence of-and its failure to meet-hiring goals for whites and males as part of its affirmative action plan.
Although it is important to remain apprised of these and other affirmative action developments on executive, judicial, and legislative fronts, it may also be helpful, in attempting to make more proactive sense of the affirmative action landscape, to examine the comments of legal scholars with respect to trends in the analysis of affirmative action. This article provides the reader with guidance in that process by digesting recent law review commentaries which address important aspects of affirmative action. These aspects include affirmative action implications of the Civil (1995) . This article demon strates that, contrary to popular belief, the CRA of 1991 did not provide clear support for affirmative action Rather, passage of the Act at best served to maintain, but not codify, previous law on affirmative action, which remains highly subject to ongoing judicial revision. The article points out that a core of current Supreme Court justices disfavors affirmative action, which often "unfairly squeezes employers between the competing demands of disparate treatment and disparate impact law" (81 Va. L.Rev. at 574; the latter theory is typically used by protected class non members to challenge affirmative action programs).
Munro's article also explains how the debate surrounding the use of quotas in AAPs ultimately left the Act ambiguous and contradictory with respect to race-based preferences in employment. A primary focus of the debate involved elements of disparate impact liability, including the definition of "business necessity" for use in defending employment practices which have a disparate impact, and whether quotas would' be required in practical terms to avoid such liability. Nevertheless, the definitions which ultimately appeared in Section I 04 of the Act failed to define either business necessity or job relatedness, and left the courts with broad interpretive discretion, notwithstanding Section lOS's stated intent to revert to the law as it had existed prior to the Supreme Court's 1989 Wards Cove decision. In addition, Section 106's prohibition against "race-nor ruing" of employment tests (adjustment of scores along racial lines) made it more likely that employers with demographic imbalances in their workforces would be forced to adopt outright racial preferences, which are increasingly subject to reverse discrimination attack. Even Section 116's "simple, direct" language that nothing in the Act "should be construed to affect affirmative action [programs] that are in accordance with the law" carries the implied caveat that not all such programs are legal. Rather than explicitly validating or preserving programs that are "in accordance," this language leaves the propriety of individual AAPs up to the courts. In sum, Munro argues, these sections of the Act "produce a decidedly muddled picture of congressional intent ... [ courts] may discern a curious 'canceling out' effect among the relevant sections." The author maintains that failure 34 of the Act to support affirmative action Was a result of conservatives' success in framing the debate as one about quotas, and that, "in their rush to define the Civil Rights bill as anti-preference legislation ...supporters of affirmative action were the chief source of the provisions that 'cancel out' the proaffirmative action sections" (81 Va. L.Rev. at 599-601). Munro's article concludes with an interesting proposal for replacing racial preferences with economic disadvantage preferences, a proposal that might bear consideration should the subject of affirmative action be legislatively revisited in the future. A principal goal of affirmative action is to reapportion jobs and wealth such that the economic position of minorities becomes mughly equal to that of whites. Because economic st.tus correlates significantly with race, this goal can be more directly (and less controversially) accomplished by ail economic, rather than a racial, 
Historical Perspective
As discussed in the previous issue of TIP, the U.S. Supreme Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995 held that federal affirmative action programs that use racial and ethnic criteria as bases for decision making are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. This standard requires that an AAP be "narrowly tailored" to effectuate a "compelling government interest." Successful defense of an AAP under this standard typically requires either specific evidence of past discrimination caused by the program which the AAP seeks to redress or a "manifest imbalance" between the makeup of an organization's work force and that of the local labor pool, and a showing that the rights of non-minorities have not been "unnecessarily trammeled" (Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. Weber, 443 US. 193, (1979) there were two different standards with respect to state or local racial classifications on one hand, and those in federal affirmative action and set-aside programs on the other ( 46 Lab. L.J. at 665). The former were held to strict judicial scrutiny before Adarand, as they still are; all such classifications were conclusively presumed to be invidious by their very existence. The latter (federal) classifications, however, were presumed to be "benign," and were thus held only to"intermediate" scrutiny (i.e., only had to serve a ''signifi~ant" government purpose, rather than a "compelling" one; Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 ( 1990)). Adarand brings these two standards into alignment; federally imposed preferential treatment is still allowable, but only under more exacting standards of judicial review. Robinson et al. predict that most federal programs will be able to meet the compelling government interest test, but are more likely to run afoul of the "narrowly tailored" language, which requires that race-neutral alternatives be considered and found unworkable before race-based programs can be permissibly implel)lented ( 46 Lab. L.J. at 667).
Next, it is important to determine what the Adarand decision forecasts with respect to future changes in the law applicable to AAPs. In this regard, interested readers may fmd Welsh's analysis illuminating. This article was written while the Adarand case was pending, but its thorough analysis of prior judicial decisions, speeches, and writings of individual Supreme Court justices enabled the author to correctly predict the increased scrutiny now applicable to federal AAPs. Welsh observes that at least one Justice (Stevens) appears likely to focus on the characteristics shared by members of a disadvantaged class (e.g., socio-economic, rather than racial ones) that justifY the use of AAPs. This analysis may open the door for economic-based classifications to supplant more objectionable race-based classifications (as Mu~o proposes), in order to prevent complete abolishment of AAPs. It is interesting to note here that economic classifications need only survive the more lenient "rational basis" standard of review, under which classifications need only be shown to be rationally related to a "legitimate" (as opposed to "significant" or "compelling") government interest to survive constitutional scrutiny.
Affirmative Action and Reverse Discrim.i.nation
It has been estimated that almost two thirds of the population (women and minorities) are entitled to preferential treatment under affirmative action, while the other third (white males) are not ( race-or gender-based quotaS, and urges that glass ceiling initiatives not exclude white non-Hispanic men. As Kandel notes, "it is altoge)her sensible that initiatives undertaken to reduce turnover and enhance upward mobility of women and minorities be equally applicable to white males. Besides spreading the benefits of worthwhile programs throughout its workforce, the 'inclusive' employer thereby reduces or eliminates the 'white male anger' which can otherwise undermine such affirmative efforts" (21 Empl. Rei. L.J. at 115). Kandel also observes that program inclusiveness (availability to whites as well as minorities) was a major factor saving the affirmative action skills training program in Weber (443 U.S. 193) from a finding that it had violated Title VII.
Employment Tests and the Economic Efficiency of AAPs
The Glass Ceiling Commission's focus on eliminating barriers to full and fair competition for upwardly mobile jobs relates directly to the issue of economic efficiency of AAPs.
As Kandel makes clear, the qualified (or unqualified) individuals will be necessarily selected over more qualified individuals pursuant to AAPs, and that a negative relationship therefore must exist between affirmative action and workforce productivity. Selmi debunks these myths by demonstrating that the often-minor differences between employment test scores of the "most qualified" candidate and those of the affirmative action candidate in reverse discrimination cases are typically only weak predictors of potential dif ferences in future productivity. Selmi further argues that discrimination is economically inefficient, and that voluntary AAPs can actually be rational employer responses to the persistence of employment discrimination. Selmi contends that AAPs can alter workplace incentives so as to increase effort, and thus productivity, among both protected class members and non members.
~
In support of these arguments, Selmi provides evidence from a number of studies to show that AAPs have not been linked to significant productivity losses. The author then utilizes principles regarding the standard error of measurem~nt and true scores to show that test score ranking differentials in actual reported cases are virtually meaningless from both practical and statistical points of view. With regard to productivity, Selmi presents an economic analysis to show that a more competitive environment can be created through AAPs by increasing the perception of opportunity in the workplace for groups that might otherwise be discouraged from participating at optimal levels. This analysis dovetails nicely with Kandel's point about global" competition, and the potential I contribution of glass ceiling and other affirmative action initiatives for U.S. companies to develop "multilingual, multicultural adeptness" in order to compete effectively in the international marketplace.
Summary and Conclusion
From these articles, it seems reasonable to conclude that race-based affirmative action will continue to draw fire for practical as well as political purposes. If the goal of affirmative action is to reapportion jobs and wealth II ,,
